In this continuously updating blog we map the worst-case scenario for the conflict between Iran and Israel. Updated 19/4/2024.
The first version of the article was published at Tuomas Malinen’s Forecasting Newsletter and GnS Economics Newsletter. We urge you to check them for the full article, with forecasts. This entry only tracks the worst-case scenario.
Twilight in the Middle East
Tensions in the Middle East have been rising steadily after the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) started their ground campaign in Gaza after 7th October, 2023, when Hamas struck Israel. On 1st April, Israel bombed the Iranian embassy in Damascus, Syria, killing seven military advisers of which two were senior members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The strike naturally led to calls for retaliation from Iranian leadership, and on the night between 13-14 April, it came. During the Saturday/Sunday night, Iran hit Israel directly, for the first time ever, with around 170 drones, 120 ballistic missiles and 30 cruise missiles. Video evidence of several missile hits to various parts of Israel refuted the original U.S. and Israeli claims that “practically everything” had been intercepted, while most of the drones and missiles were shot down even before they entered Israeli airspace.
IRGC listed four main targets for the strikes: Ramon and Nevatim airbases (from where the attacks to the embassy in Damascus where allegedly launched), Israeli Air Force intelligence HQ in Tel Aviv (where the attack on the Iranian Consulate was allegedly planned), and degrading of Israeli air defence radars and assets. Reportedly both of the airbases were hit, in addition to a “secret” Mossad base in the Golan Heights. So, from this point of view, the attack of Iran was a success. The vast majority of drones and missiles were probably used to test the air defence capabilities and to keep it busy, which would be the main reason for the high “kill rate”. Preliminary reports and video evidence (see, e.g. this and this) also indicates that Iran may have struck the airbases with hypersonic missiles (or ‘glide devices’). This naturally raises the threat Iran poses to Israel, and the U.S., to a completely different level.
Israeli forces struck back last night in what appears to be a limited strike in and around Isfahan in central Iran, which holds nuclear facilities and a drone factory. No ground hits were reported, while an “explosion at a factory” was reported. There are also reports that Israel might have struck some sites in Iraq and Syria, but these are uncorroborated claims at this point. There’s even speculation that the strike would have been conducted by a proxy-force within Iran itself. In any case, there are two plausible explanations for the weakness of the Israeli response:
Iranian strikes during the weekend rattled the Israelian regime and it did not want to escalate further, but just conduct a “show-strike” to save face.
The Israeli strike was a reconnaissance operation to learn about the air defence capabilities of Iran around one of its nuclear facility.
What I know from Israel through my personal contacts in Middle East intelligence community, I am suspecting it was the latter (while I hope it was #1). It’s not in the nature of Israelian regime to be scared of formidable force and to embarrass themselves with strikes making them look weak. I can naturally be wrong about this (and I hope I am), but I am suspecting we have not seen the actual strike from Israel.
Government sources of Jerusalem Post indicated that this was actually the response from Israel. If this truly is the case, Iran would have won this ‘mexican standoff’ hands down. We have to wait and see.
The worst-case scenario
I will not make any detailed predictions on military operations, as I am no expert on those. Instead, I will present the wider military (and geopolitical) developments that could take place. The worst series of events the Iran-Israel conflict could follow are:
Iran strikes Israel with missiles. (Check).
Israel and the U.S. retaliate striking several cities and military installations in Iran. (Check or ongoing).
Iran strikes Israel, again, and hits several U.S. military bases in the region, while Houthis/Iran launch an assault on the Dwight D. Eisenhower carrier strike group in the Red Sea inflicting heavy losses.
Iran enables its nuclear weapon program with the aim of manufacturing six nuclear weapons in a month (this is likely to be already running).
China, Russia and dozens of countries across the globe call for restraint, but they fall on deaf ears.
The U.S. launches major bombing campaign of Iran with B-52 and B-2 strategic bombers, while the U.S., Israel and allies attempt to destroy the nuclear weapon facilities of Iran; retaliatory strikes engulf the region.
Russia steps in destroying U.S. assets in the region using hypersonic missiles.
Israel nukes Iran after suffering devastating losses from continuing Iranian missile strikes, and Iran retaliates with a nuclear strike.
Russia or the U.S. launch a nuclear strike with the other party responding.
Nuclear war erupts.
Once again, this is a worst-case scenario and we consider it likely that the cycle of escalation will be cut off before we reach phases 6-10. It’s possible that we may even stop at #2, but the question everyone should ask is, if Israel strikes Iran and Iran retaliates, and the cycle repeats, can the U.S. really stay on the sidelines? Any direct U.S. involvement in the retaliatory strikes would put the worst-case scenario in motion, in its entirety.
In any case, mapping the worst path of events allows us to understand, where we could be heading. I will now explain the assumptions and facts behind these 10 phases in more detail. Let’s start with the capabilities of Iran.
How big of a threat Iran is?
There have been considerable uncertainties concerning the missile strike capabilities of Iran. Strikes Iran conducted during the weekend answered some of those, but we need to look at the evidence widely to get a comprehensive picture.
First, the lack of quick response of Israel and the efforts of the Biden administration to downplay and de-escalate the situation (to which the narrative on the “success” of countering Iranian missiles is probably aimed at) hints that they are somewhat rattled by what took place. The (likely) hypersonic strikes, which seem to have penetrated most of the defence capabilities of Israel, the U.S. and their allies, are the likely reason for this. There are also (uncorroborated) reports that the U.S. contacted Iran to allow a symbolic strike on Israel to save face. The tactic of the Biden Administration first was scare-mongering, with President Biden vowing for ‘ironclad’ support to Israel, yet at the same time, the Biden administration asked China to convey a message to Teheran not to retaliate. Now, the Biden administration made clear that it will not take part in any of the retaliatory attacks of Israel on Iran. All this implies that the U.S. sees the threat posed by Iran as non-negligible.
Secondly, there is historical evidence indicating that Iran has build a formidable missile and drone striking capabilities. For example, there was a “show of force” missile strikes by Iran on the Ayn al-Asad U.S. military base in Iraq on January 8, 2020. Regardless of an advance notice of several hours (to move people away or in the shelters), air defences were unable to counter the strikes.
Thirdly, in early February, it was reported that Iran would be able to produce enough enriched uranium for a nuclear weapons in a week, and that it could manufacture six nuclear weapons in a month and 12 in five months. So essentially, Iran could join the “nuclear family” in just a month’s time, if it has not already done so. This is because we need to assume that Iran has enacted her nuclear weapons program after the attacks to the embassy in Damascus (because Teheran knew it needed to respond, which could lead to a cycle of escalation).
Fourthly, there were reports that Russia conducted a high-altitude intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test, launched from Kapustin Yar airbase in south Russia, with the missile seen flying over Iraq late Friday. This cannot be considered anything other than a show of force and support for Iranian actions by Russia. Considering that China would also be likely to rally in support of Iran, against Israel and the U.S., any larger conflict between Israel and Iran would have the potential to spread like wildfire in the Middle East and the world.
These four points increase the likelihood that the cycle of escalation would stop at #2. Iran (+allies) is a grave threat to Israel and the U.S. assets in the region.
The fall of an empire
There can naturally be many different military strategical outcomes driven, and plays conducted, by the Iranian and Israeli (U.S.) regimes. What I have presented above has been based on the assumption that both China and Russia are willing to become active players in the conflict. This can arise for two reasons.
China and Russia consider it to be in their best interest not to allow their strongest ally in the strategically very important region to become overrun militarily.
They see an opening to undermine, if not to completely annihilate, the military hegemony of the United States.
I would consider #2 to be an unlikely aim, because playing a ‘hegemony-game’ with the U.S. has extremely high stakes. This is because any empire will not relinquish its power without a (desperate) struggle. I actually consider it to be more likely for the U.S. to use nuclear weapons first in the Middle East than Russia, not to speak of China.1
However, #1 is something especially Russia will, most likely, hold on to. This is because the ties between the two countries run deep. Both Iran and Russia, for example, challenge the US-led Atlanticist ideological and power systems. Moreover, as Dr Ghoncheh Tazmini, a visiting fellow at the Middle East Centre of the London School of Economics, notes:
Both states oppose the idea of a single state or constellation of states (an order) as being able to impose normative values and power structures as universal. Instead, Moscow and Tehran subscribe to a more pluralistic vision of the international order, favouring sovereign internationalism over liberal interventionism.
Thus, while Moscow’s mercurial manoeuvrings have made it a challenge to decipher the nature of Russian-Iranian relations, my research substantiates the case that Moscow-Tehran alignment is firmly anchored within a broader assemblage of shared principles and priorities. Considering Iran’s regional entanglements, and Moscow’s expanding footprint in various theatres, the US and rivalling states will have to consider the uncomfortable reality that Russian-Iranian alignment is likely to be an enduring feature of the Middle Eastern political landscape.
This is why it’s likely that Russia will go all-the-way to defend Iran. The high-altitude ICBM test, conducted at the eve of the Iranian attacks, was a clear testimony of this. If there was a threat that the Iranian regime would be over-run, Russia would, most likely, step in with full force. This would imply that, in the end, the U.S. would need to take a similar stance with Israel. This would, almost certainly, lead to a nuclear confrontation between Russia and the U.S., if push came to shove.
However, we should also remember that neither the administration of President Biden nor Putin is likely to seek a nuclear holocaust. That is why I think that reaching #9 requires truly extraordinary, and dark, events occurring not just in the Middle East, but also in Ukraine.
Thus, even if we would reach #8, the U.S. and Russia engaging in nuclear confrontation would be a tall order. Yet, it’s not beyond the realms of possibility.
Read more from Tuomas Malinen’s Forecasting Newsletter or GnS Economics Newsletter.
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